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Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine how human experience (thoughts, feelings) has been 
treated in archaeology and how phenomenology is traditionally employed in 
archaeological research. Phenomenological approaches have been heavily critiqued as 
lacking in rigor. Many argue that the differences between past and present human 
experience is too vast to allow for valid interpretations. I propose that humans in the past 
and present are similar enough to allow for plausible inferences. Further, I argue that 
phenomenological interpretations of the past are special forms of analogies, which are 
accepted by many within the archaeological community. To bolster these interpretations, 
new theories in cognitive science support the validity of phenomenological inference. 
Based on those insights I elaborate on methodology for constructing and evaluating 
phenomenological analogs in archaeological interpretation. 
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Introduction 
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 Archaeological method, theory and interpretive paradigms are always in a state of 
flux and proceed through time as a conversation that mirrors the Zeitgeist (Trigger 1989). 
Beginning in the 1960s, when the U. S. was engaged in the space program, the cold war, 
and the war in Vietnam, archaeology underwent a scientific turn because of a profound 
interest in science sparked by new technological achievements. At the time, U.S 
anthropology tried to explain culture through behavior (Trigger 1989: 394). Archaeology 
critiqued earlier paradigms such as culture-history and functional-processual 
archaeologies as deficient. Processual archaeology explains culture as adapting to 
changes in population, environment, and inter-cultural competition (Trigger 1989: 394). 
Archaeologists operating under this framework were mainly interested in 
questions concerning past subsistence patterns and technology. (Binford 1967; Yellen 
1977; Vayda 1971; Sahlins and Service 1960; Tosi 1976; Smith 1976). Processual 
archaeologists assumed that past people were rational, arriving at logical solutions to 
problems. The unit of meaningful analysis for Processualists was on the systemic level of 
past human groups employing scientific methodology. The individual was still visible but 
generalizable features of human behavior were highlighted (Trigger 1989: 395-400). 
As a reaction to the focus on science and process, a more humanistic theoretical 
focus followed, and archaeologists became more interested in meaning, symbolism, and 
human cognition (Hodder 1992; Shanks and Tilley 1982). Julian Thomas (2008: 300) 
critiques archaeological work under the paradigm of the New Archaeology 
(Processualism) because it leads to ethical problems. One of the problems resulting from 
too much empiricism is that the past is thought to be objectified. Further, the past is 
appropriated through the archaeologist’s own experience and understanding of the 
material record. According to Thomas, the aim of the Processualists was to formalize 
human behavior which he argues, lead to broad generalizations and essentialization of 
past people (2000: 8). Therefore, the goal for Post-processualism is interpretation and not 
explanation. 
The claim that scientific method in archaeology is totalizing and colonialist made 
by Thomas is unfair. These critiques do not account for the biological, physical, and 
cognitive similarities between groups or individuals. Moreover, these attacks are 
essentializing in their own way because existing regularities in human behavior are 
ignored. In rejecting any similarities between humans, we would never be able to 
understand other individuals at all, which is not productive for archaeology or for 
anthropology in general.  
Kohl suggests that there is continuity between post-processual and processual 
archaeology. He welcomes the diversity introduced to archaeological interpretation by 
post-processual approaches (1993: 14), but suggests that some form of testing is still 
necessary to prevent mere speculation, or in Kohls’ words: 
 
Some of the more unguarded, hyperbolic statements of his [Binford’s] post-
processual nemesis, Hodder, unfortunately have implied that this Pandora’s box 
should be opened , resulting inevitably, of course, in the realization that Mr. von 
Daniken’s readings of prehistory are as true and meaningful as those of Mr. 
Hodder (Kohl 1993: 16). 
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Christopher Tilley (1994) was the first to introduce a phenomenological approach 
to archaeological interpretations. A pioneer in this endeavor, his work examines human 
experience of the landscape in his book the Phenomenology of Landscape. Tilley draws 
on Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in terms of a body centered human 
phenomenology: Humans experience the world through their bodies through the senses 
(Tilley 1994: 12).  
Tilley’s work was originally not well-received by all, but the phenomenological 
method has returned under different guises such as the archaeology of the senses, 
experiential archaeology, and some experimental archaeologies. Newer approaches to 
archaeological interpretations critiquing phenomenology are essentially just as 
phenomenological. A good example is found in Yanis Hamilakis’ Archaeology and the 
Senses. Hamilakis extends his phenomenology to all senses and suggests that 
archaeologists study the “sensorium,” that comes together to create past sensual worlds. 
The “sensorium” encompasses senses connected to the sensory organs and sensory fields 
such as smell or taste but does not focus solely on sight. Hamilakis’ method, similar to 
Tilley, uses his own self-reflective background to understand the human experience of 
reconstructed burial practices in Bronze Age Crete (Hamilakis 2014: 130). 
Dealing with past human experience has proven to be problematic. This is 
because the material record in itself does not provide enough evidence to directly connect 
material remains to more abstract qualities of the human reality as for example meaning, 
emotions, and feelings. For this reason, phenomenology in archaeology became the target 
of multiple critiques (Brück 2005), which suggested that phenomenological 
interpretations lacked rigor and proper methodology and made too many assumptions 
(Fleming 1999). 
Furthermore, Meskell (1996) argued that humans from the past and present may 
be more different than assumed, complicating valid inferences about past human feelings 
and thoughts. However, the recent “ontological turn” in anthropology suggests that only 
cultural meaning is relative while the world cultures are explaining remains the same 
(Heywood 2017). Other critiques are concerned that by using a self-reflective method, 
archaeologists are introducing Methodological Individualism into their interpretations. 
Methodological Individualism is the idea that we may understand social groups through 
distinct agent behavior, in other words, explaining collective behavior as the aggregate of 
individual actions.  
The term Methodological Individualism was introduced by Max Weber and was 
adopted by sociology and economics (Weber 1978: 3-62; Agassi 1960). Critics of this 
method argue that characteristics of social organization are reduced to the sum of single 
agent behavior which does not account for individual variation. Sperber (1997) for 
example, argues that a lot of individual behavior is unintentional or motivated by biases. 
Methodological Individualism requires individual agency to be the most fundamental unit 
of analysis. However, phenomenological archaeology is not trying to explain but to 
understand the past. Relying too much on individual experience of the archaeologist 
might narrow our understanding of the past. Through experimentation on subjects in the 
present it would be possible to arrive at a more nuanced picture of human experience 
based on group or responses and cross cultural observations. 
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Here, I will argue that phenomenological interpretations have been dismissed 
prematurely, but I agree with Brück that there has been little methodological 
development. Naturalized phenomenology abandons anti-naturalistic tendencies of 
phenomenology in favor of naturalism (Zahavi 2010: 3), which is the idea that the 
physical world exists in a material sense and scientific methodology is best suited to 
understand our physical world (Kim 2003). Naturalized phenomenology enables 
phenomenological philosophy to meaningfully employ empirical methods (Zahavi 2010: 
14). I make the case that the cognitive sciences support a phenomenological approach by 
generating testable theories that can be applied to human cognition and sensual 
experience. Experimentation using statistical analyses as well as cross-cultural subject 
testing and psychological methodology can be used to better understand human behavior. 
This might enable a more fine-grained picture of past human experience and variation to 
emerge. Phenomenology in archaeology can use empirical methods to further 
understanding of the past and does not need to establish general scientific claims about it. 
In the philosophy of phenomenology there is a debate between a realist and 
idealist reading of Edmund Husserl and Heidegger. The realist view accepts that there is 
a physical reality which can be explained scientifically (Dreyfus and Spinosa 1999). 
Idealism rejects the notion of an independent physical reality and suggests that 
experience of the world is created by the individual (Royce 1919). However, in each case 
archaeological practice remains unchanged and only the philosophical interpretation will 
change. 
To better employ phenomenology in archaeology researchers may focus on 
naturalized phenomenology in which phenomenological thought is extended through the 
use of scientific methodology (Yoshimi 2016: 287). The tendency to utilize psychological 
and other scientifically-oriented fields to support phenomenological claims has a long 
tradition. However, Husserl and Heidegger were opposed to introducing empirical 
approaches into their phenomenologies. Archaeologists may strive for a naturalized 
phenomenology in order to ground an understanding of past human experience in testable 
data. Phenomenology in archaeology is complicated because there are two levels of 
inquiry. The first level is concerned with the experience of the archaeologist doing field 
work. Second, there is the level of phenomenological interpretation of the past. I focus on 
the second level of phenomenology in archaeology dealing with the interpretation of past 
human behavior.  
Further, I argue that the use of phenomenology in archaeology could be seen as a 
special form of relational analogy. Analogy has a long standing tradition in 
archaeological interpretation that has been well-accepted by the archaeological 
community. Some of the methods used to bolster analogies can be used to improve 
phenomenology. Analogical arguments posit a relationship between past and present 
behaviors or artifact forms, based on environmental, cultural and material similarities 
between two human groups across time (Wylie 1989: 11). The analog in 
phenomenological archaeology is the modern human experience. The connection 
between the past and present in phenomenological archaeology may be made through the 
commonalties between modern humans across time justified by shared physiological 
features (such as similarities in biology), basic physical laws such as gravity, weather 
effects such as wind, rain, snow, and basic perceptions such as heat and cold. It may be 
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argued that these are simply low level similarities, but they are not trivial. As Tilley 
(1994: 74) argues, basic perceptions are fundamental to human understanding and 
provide a context for shared human experience. Ultimately, similarities in human 
experience past and present are based in the semblance between the brain and the sensual 
organs. Because archaeologists only deal with material remains, in order to understand 
past human experience we must establish what can be reasonably inferred about human 
experience across time and space through the material record.  
Historian R. G. Collingwood (1946) argues that we can experience the past by 
putting ourselves in the shoes of others. Through this we create a model of past 
experience in the present. Collingwood’s idea was originally designed for written history. 
Consider for example, that we can imagine how Socrates may have felt drinking the 
hemlock. This approach could be useful to understand the experience of past humans we 
encounter through the archaeological record. The archaeologist becomes the source for 
analogies between past and present human experience. The more archaeologists now 
about the context the better the we can understand the past (Collingwood 1946: 282) 
This can be supported by Theory of Mind (ToM). This theory posits that we have 
a general idea about the motivations of other individuals, which causes them to behave in 
the way they behave. Moreover, the immanent human skill of understanding others 
allows archaeologists to gain an understanding of the cognitive processes which informed 
past human behavior. ToM is not perfect but, as suggested by research, it sufficiently 
allows us to gauge each other’s intent (Gallagher and Frith 2003; Gallagher et al. 2000). 
ToM could potentially be applied to people of the past because ToM suggests that people 
are capable of understanding the intentionality of other human beings which could be 
expanded to past humans. This can be bolstered with archaeological knowledge to better 
comprehend past human experience. In other words ToM predicts that the more 
knowledge we have about another person the better we can predict their intent. This is 
analogous to the archaeologist’s knowledge of the past peoples and their increased 
understanding.  
ToM is valuable for mentally healthy human adults in their daily lives because 
they use ToM for successful social organization (Goldstein and Winner 2012: 19). ToM 
abilities might be limited in some individuals such as for example in schizophrenic 
patients (Sprong et. al 2007). Further, studies on children show that ToM can be trained 
(Goldstein and Winner 2012). This could mean that ToM abilities might improve over 
time and through experience. Bayesian probability (Poldrack 2011) suggests that 
archaeologists could improve their inferences regarding past peoples based on thorough 
knowledge about the natural and socio/cultural environment that they would have 
experienced. 
Finally, I propose a methodology for evaluating and constructing 
phenomenological analogies based on the archaeological record. I propose a combination 
of phenomenological archaeology and ToM to arrive at a more refined understanding of 
the past, by introducing modifications to phenomenological archaeology. Phenomenology 
in archaeology alone will not be sufficient to understand past life experience and 
archaeologists need continue the hard work of reconstructing past societies using material 
evidence as necessary and valuable tools that aid in understanding human experience. 
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Archaeological and paleoenvironmental data can be used to create reconstructed 
environments and behaviors that help us to gain a better understanding of past lived 
experience by situating past people in context. Geographic Information Systems can be 
used to interpret spatial relationships among different artifacts, features and their 
locations and can create viewsheds and least cost pathways in intrasite or intersite 
analyses. Julian Thomas critiques such methodology as broadly generalizing and 
essentializing the past (2000: 8). But, Thomas is too extreme in his rejection of all 
general features of the human experience. There are at least some basic level similarities 
of human experience such as for example, the day and night cycle. Thomas might agree 
more with the use of experimental archaeology as reconstructions and experiments that 
create “lived experiences.” Additionally, computer simulations, reconstructions, and 
visualizations allow to us to experience the predicted past appearance of a site (Ch’ng 
2009; Dunn and Woolford 2012). In this way, archaeologists may use multiple strands of 
evidence to flesh out past environments in which to embed imagined human agents. Not 
only can an analogical approach be applied, but reconstructions, visualizations, and 
experimentation can be used, and statistical approaches applied to human group 
reactions. 
For archaeologists whose goal is to understand past experience, naturalized 
phenomenology offers a framework for such a discourse. The point is that archaeologists 
need a transparent theoretical foundation to achieve these goals. Further, archaeologists 
should state clearly when they employ a phenomenological paradigm. Only then can a 
strongly theorized phenomenology in archaeology be formulated, strengthening 
arguments about past human experience. However, a phenomenology in archaeology will 
necessarily be a weak version because we are not able to understand everything about 
past human experience. A major tenet of such a phenomenological approach is a 
decipherment regarding what can be inferred and what cannot. But, here I argue that 
archaeologists are able to gain a rough experiential understanding of the past and at the 
same time avoid methodological individualism. Further, archaeologists are able to 
prevent totalizing of past people through the use of statistical evaluations of quantitative 
studies concerned with aspects of human experience. The more archaeologists know 
about human experience the better and more specific interpretations of the past will 
become.  
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the fundamentals of phenomenology as 
applicable to archaeological interpretation. In the second chapter I discuss the 
phenomenological literature for archaeology and relevant critiques of phenomenology in 
archaeology. An overview about analogy in archaeological interpretation is given in the 
third chapter, and a phenomenological interpretation in archaeology is framed as a special 
kind of archaeological analogy. In Chapter 4 I will discuss the potential of ToM to 
support phenomenological interpretations of the past. In the last chapter I will introduce a 
synthesis and expansion of different methodologies to improve the rigor of 
phenomenological interpretations of past human experience. 
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Chapter 1 
Phenomenology 
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This chapter deals with phenomenology. First, phenomenology is defined. 
Introspection is established as a stepping stone to better understand phenomenology. 
Husserlian phenomenology is introduced followed by Heideggerian phenomenology. 
Finally, the relevance of phenomenology in understanding human past from the 
archaeological record is sketched. 
Phenomenology studies phenomena as the basis of human experience of the world 
and the objects within that world (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2003). The term 
“phenomenon” refers to the appearance of things and not to their physical or chemical 
composition (Husserl 1991: 2). Phenomena can be objects such as pyramids, temples, or 
monuments as they appear, or more complex experiences such as life goals, and the 
personal life history of an individual (Heidegger 2008).  
The goal of phenomenology is to describe how people perceive and experience 
the world and to identify common features of human experience. Phenomenology is 
concerned with processes of the mind and not directly with the physical world, bearing in 
mind that our mental experience of the world is connected with our bodily experience 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962). Husserl and Heidegger can be both read as either realist or idealist 
(Holmes 1975: 98; Blattner 1994: 193; Ameriks 1977: 501; Glazebrook 2001: 376). 
Phenomenology based in realism is better suited for archaeological inquiry because 
archaeological research is concerned with material culture. 
Phenomenology uses the method of self-understanding similar to Descartes who 
uses self-meditation as the basis for his philosophical thought. For him self-analysis or 
meditation can lead to the formation of correct beliefs if the right process of inference is 
applied. The process for correct self-analysis is for Descartes connected with the ‘I’ or 
self-awareness: 
 
Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, 
understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses. That is 
a long list of attributes for me to have—and it really is I who have them all. Why 
should it not be? Isn’t it one and the same ‘I’ who now doubts almost everything, 
understands some things, affirms this one thing [...] But the ‘I’ who imagines is 
also this same ‘I’. For even if (as I am pretending) none of the things that I 
imagine really exist, I really do imagine them, and this is part of my thinking. 
Lastly, it is also this same ‘I’ who senses or is aware of bodily things seemingly 
through the senses. Because I may be dreaming, I can’t say for sure that I now see 
the flames, hear the wood crackling, and feel the heat of the fire; but I certainly 
seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed (Descartes 1996: 10). 
 
This means even if an external world does not exist, the process of thinking would 
still be real because we are aware of the fact that we think. For Descartes this self-
cogitation is the only way of attaining knowledge about the world because every other 
source can be doubted. This is important because the focus is shifted to the question how 
humans perceive the world and not so much on the physical world itself. Furthermore, 
when phenomenology is used to recreate the experience of past people through 
archaeology, this kind of self-analysis is typically the methodological basis, using the 
archaeologist’s own experience to build an analogy for past peoples’ experience. 
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There is a debate within philosophical phenomenology about reading Husserl and 
Heidegger in rather realist or idealist terms. Some argue that some statements of Husserl 
suggest that he was indeed idealist (Ameriks 1977: 499). Ameriks argues that this is not 
necessarily true because Husserlian phenomenology assumes the existence of a physical 
world (1977: 502). In the case of Heideggerian phenomenology idealist and a realist 
readings are also possible (Blattner 1994: 186). The realist reading suggests that 
Heideggers’s conception of Dasein requires the existence of a world (Glazebrook 2001). 
It is necessary to accept a realist interpretation of both Husserl and Heidegger in what 
follows, consistent with the naturalized approach to phenomenology. 
 
1.1 Introspection 
Introspection emerged in the same period as phenomenology, and is helpful to 
begin with because it is simpler and more straightforward than phenomenology. The term 
“introspection” is associated with Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of psychology who 
established the Institute for Experimental Psychology in Leipzig (Danziger 1980).  
The concept of introspection developed in early psychology Wilhelm Wundt 
divided introspection into two separate concepts. Wundt tried to establish self-
observation as scientific under the right conditions. He achieved rigorous self-observation 
through training multiple subjects under controlled conditions to ensure stable results. 
Inner perception for Wundt was not scientific and he equated this part of introspection 
with the realm of fairy tales. It is important to clarify which specific kind of introspection 
is meant when using the term introspection. Only by clearly differentiating between 
internal perception and self-observation it is possible to prevent mixing mere storytelling 
with rigorous methodology. According to Danziger: 
 
The basis for Wundt’s initial discussion of the problem of introspection is 
provided by his insistence on the distinction between “self-observation” 
(Selbstbeobachtung) and “internal perception” (Innere Wahrmehmung).’’ 
Unfortunately, English language references to Wundt’s position almost invariably 
fail to reproduce this distinction and use only the single term “introspection” to 
cover both concepts indiscriminately. This not only makes it difficult to 
understand the nature of Wundt’s contribution to the problem of introspection, it 
also leads to the appearance of extraordinary inconsistency [...] (1980: 245). 
 
The claim that introspection is scientific is important when discussing 
phenomenology especially in connection with archaeology (Danziger 1980). Wundt is 
transforming the Cartesian conception of self-analysis which solely rests on inner 
experience into an endeavor which can be correlated with external stimuli (Danziger 
1980). This serves especially well in psychology in which the reaction of individuals to 
various stimuli is an important part of inquiry. Wundt’s approach is problematic for 
archaeology because past people cannot be tested directly and self-observation cannot be 
correlated easily with external stimuli. Archaeologists need to develop other approaches 
anchoring past human experiences with empirical data. Such an archaeological method of 
introspection should consider the special situation of archaeological inquiry, which has to 
bridge large temporal gaps between recent and past experience. This is because we can 
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only use our experience to approximate past human experience. A phenomenological 
approach in archaeology can increase methodological rigor through psychology and the 
cognitive sciences. 
Husserl and Heidegger are very influential in the development of phenomenology 
(Dowling 2007). Heidegger started as the student of Husserl and later developed his own 
type of phenomenology. While Husserl and Heidegger are situated in the social context 
of the late 19
th
 and 20th century, Heidegger’s thought developed through the mid-20th 
century.
1
 
 
1.2 Husserl 
Husserl published 5 books and some 20 essays through his academic life which 
made him a respected figure in academia and among colleagues during his active time in 
academe. He also wrote a massive number of mediations and notes that were not initially 
published, and also gave a number of lectures which were later published (Husserl 1991: 
foreword). 
Husserl’s main method of conducting phenomenological analysis starts out with a 
form of introspection which goes back to Descartes and Wundt, though Husserl did not 
use or condone the term. Husserl terms his approach ‘phenomenological’ reduction or 
‘bracketing’ (Husserl 1983: 36). Phenomenological reductions allow us to treat 
phenomena as objects of reflective analysis following an experience so that we may 
analyze the constituent parts of the experience (Husserl 1977: 18). Reductions and 
bracketing are further developed and complicated by Husserl. Even though, Husserl 
begins with meditations similar to Descartes. He further develops and theorizes 
phenomenological thought. Bracketing makes a phenomenon available to a holistic 
understanding of experience. We can understand the feelings and attitudes but also the 
world surrounding human experience. The focus of his analysis is to interrogate how 
individuals’ analyze their own experience. This analysis forms the basis to gain a deeper 
understanding of human experience and in consequence to find general structures shaping 
experience. The Phenomenological reductions and bracketing are central to Husserl’s 
methodology to investigate human experience. 
The main focus to understand phenomena is everyday experience, which is 
antecedent to all philosophy or theory (Husserl 1983: 50). The everyday mode of 
experience includes a sense of self which is presupposed by individuals as well as an 
understanding, that the world exists and that the world we know is based on what our 
senses tell us. However, the everyday mode of experience also contains a sense of overall 
                                               
1
 Heidegger is controversial because of his background in Nazi ideology beginning in the 1930s. The claim 
that Heidegger revoked Husserl’s access to the library seems to be a long living myth (Thomson 2007: 33). 
As Farias describes there were close links between Fischer and Heidegger in form of a long lasting 
friendship. Fischer was the director of the institute of racial purity which was involved in many of the Nazi 
atrocities (Farias 1991: 70). Heidegger never ended the connections between himself and the Nazi system. 
Heidegger was active at his university in organizing a Nazi student organization which put him in conflict 
with the leading party ideology (Farias 1991: 5). The publication of the black notebooks suggests that 
Heidegger’s work was indeed influenced by Nazi ideology. The black notebooks are Heidegger’s personal 
notebooks containing his thoughts and observations. Heidegger’s involvement in Nazism was complicated 
and does not support a general dismissal of Heidegger’s intellectual work as Nazi propaganda per se. 
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time which is perceived as a constant stream in the background (Husserl 1991). The 
everyday perception also includes a basic sense of spatial directions and extension. This 
mode of human perception is frames and informs our experience of a given phenomenon 
at a given time. 
Husserl analyses the perception of single objects or tones. In Husserl’s thinking 
the world can be build up through the sum of all those small-scale perceptions. For 
Husserl perceptions are modified by humans in specific ways. These modifications 
happen when memories are fading into the past. People can also recreate past experiences 
through enacting them in the present.  
Husserl tries to analyze human perception as formally as possible (which is 
probably due to his initial training as mathematician). As Husserl switched from 
mathematics to philosophy he was troubled by the situation in the field at the time which 
he thought was not scientific enough (Husserl 1991; Foreword). This is the foundation of 
his basic motivation to find generalizable and testable law-like structures in human 
perception (Husserl 1991: 371). Phenomena are connected with a sense of self which is 
termed by Husserl as ‘transcendental ego’. Some of the phenomena we experience such 
as for example a coffee cup are based on perception. The stimuli are transformed into 
mental representations which can represent objects in the physical environment. Each 
phenomenon has its own temporal duration which it occupies within time which serves as 
a temporal container for the phenomenon. To exemplify Husserl’s approach let’s use this 
excerpt: 
 
[...] I am conscious of the first time-point of the tone’s duration in the mode of the 
now. The tone is given; that is, I am conscious of it as now. But I am conscious of 
it as now “as long as” any of its phases is intended as now. However, if any 
temporal phase (corresponding to a time-point of the tone-duration) is an actually 
present now (with the exception of the initial phase), then I am conscious of 
continuity of phases as “immediately past” and of the whole extent of the 
temporal duration from the beginning-point up to the now-point as elapsed. [...] 
(1991: 26). 
 
In this excerpt Husserl is arguing that we do not hear one melody but rather a 
sequence of different tones. Our ability to remember allows us to construct a melody out 
of the different tones. This illustrates that Husserl is focused on single relatively short 
perceptions instead of longer ones. This approach is employed at many places throughout 
Husserl’s text. In the Husserlian approach it’s as if individuals perceive little snapshots of 
the world which are treated and modified snapshot by snapshot. We do not need to focus 
our analysis on whole objects or events but can also consider small parts of the objects or 
events during phenomenological analysis. In everyday situations we experience the world 
and phenomena within as a whole. The snapshot idea to understand the human experience 
is part of the deeper structure governing experience. 
Husserlian phenomenology also suggests that memory and imagination are 
important aspects of the human experience (1991: 34). Memory is more than pure 
perception; it includes additional knowledge about past personal experiences which can 
be accessed in the present to inform our current experience (Husserl 1991: 59). A 
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musician listening to a piece of music for example might have memories of a similar tune 
he experienced. A musician is in many cases able to make assumptions about the tones 
which were not already played (Husserl 1991: 54). 
1.3 Heidegger 
 
Heidegger was a student of Husserl who extended and problematized Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Whereas Husserl was focused on individual experienced objects such as 
perceptions of trees, houses, and coffee cups, Heidegger was concerned with structures at 
broader temporal and spatial scales. Heidegger developed an approach to phenomenology 
which is geared towards the whole of a human life span, and the historical situatedness of 
individuals (Heidegger 2008). Death is important in Heidegger’s phenomenology because 
an individual’s awareness of her own end can be crystallization point of discovering 
one’s life goals and the opportunity for achieving them. The realization of the finiteness 
of our existence can be a reminder for us to discover our real self’s. This means that we 
are usually part of our society and culture which prevents us from ultimately reflecting 
our possibilities and choices in life. We tend to do things because we think we are 
supposed to do them because it seems to be the proper thing to do. The historicity of an 
individual is important because people have a background which then shapes the 
opportunities, beliefs, desires and goals a person has in specific contexts. 
Heidegger distinguishes two modes of being: “authentic” and the “inauthentic” 
(Heidegger 2008). The inauthentic form of being is characterized by lostness in the man-
selbst or ‘they’ (Heidegger 2008: 387). In this instance one is predominantly concerned 
with immediate activities of the daily routine such as one knows he must pick up his 
children from school and then he must go to work etc. (Heidegger 2008). Even more 
involved decisions such as deciding to study towards a degree can be inauthentic because 
the individual might not be aware of the broader implications and possibilities such a 
decision should involve in regards to individual life goals. In the inauthentic mode of 
Dasein the full potential and opportunities are closed off. This leads to a more shallow 
form of Being. In authentic being one is aware of greater goals in one's life, rather in the 
inauthentic mode where one simply does what is required by others or by necessities. In 
archaeology phenomenology is reduced to those parts which are deemed interesting by 
archaeologists losing the deeper aspects of phenomenological thought. The man-selbst or 
‘they’ is important in connection with the “authentic” and “inauthentic” forms of being 
because it denotes what we ought to do and we are supposed to do in different social 
contexts. We can lose ourselves in the social world which diverts us from our true self. 
This is called by Heidegger ‘lostness’. 
Everything in the world has a special kind of being. A stone for example is not the 
same kind of active agent as a dog. Animals have a different form of being than the stone 
because animals actively do things in the world through their behavior and intentionality. 
Humans are different from animals because humans are interested in the world in a way 
animals are not. People have goals and moods that a dog cannot access. Dasein is 
Heidegger’s term encapsulating the special kind of Being humans have in relation to the 
world (Heidegger 2008: 78). This active quality of human experience is identified by 
Heidegger as the care structure. 
13 
 
We are limited in our possibilities by our past. There are two types of personal 
history. One is the individual life history comprising our past decision and family history 
(Heidegger 2008: 426,430,434). This encompasses our education, skills, and assumptions 
of the world we share with our relatives. The second meaning of historicity consists of 
social class, nationality, and cultural background of the large group of people or nation 
we belong to (Heidegger 2008: 436). Historicity is different from academic history which 
was concerned with dates of events and important personalities (Heidegger 2008: 431). 
Memory is also important for Heideggerian phenomenology because for personal history 
to be effective in the present we need to be able to remember (2008: 434). This is 
important for archaeological interpretation because individuals in the past were similarly 
restricted in their choices by their historical context. 
Our personal history and the history of our country or culture ‘throw’ us in a 
sense into the world. We understand our world through history and the role each of us 
incarnates in his world. There is a sense of direction in our life which originates in 
personal history. We are pushed toward certain possibilities (Heidegger 2008: 434). The 
notion of history as fundamental to the human experience opens Heideggerian 
phenomenology to broader cultural influences on our experience of the world (Heidegger 
2008: 424). This is important to archaeologists because the material remains we find were 
imbued with meaning. 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of space focuses on meaningful locations or regions 
relative to Dasein’s concerns and projects. A computer for example rests on the desk 
because that area is our home office. The lake is located in the recreation area which we 
use to relax. This kind of “existential space” is meaningful because phenomenological 
space is defined in terms of being for something. This is different from mere physical 
space consisting of measurements, which are simply there but are not meaningfully 
connected to human experience. Our default mode of experiencing space is in terms of 
the meaning a certain space offers us. Space, as defined by measurements is secondary 
and related to certain specialized contexts such as performing scientific work, complying 
with government regulations (Heidegger 2008: 114). Archaeologists turned to 
phenomenology in order to prevent the interpretation of the archaeological record to 
become a collection of measurements disconnected from human experience. 
In Heideggerian phenomenology there is no pure perception because we are 
concerned with our lives (2008: 225). We care for example about driving an electric 
vehicle to demonstrate our care for the environment. We use tools to achieve what we 
care for (Heidegger 2008: 97). If I want for example to repair the old door of the shed, I 
use a screw driver to fix the hinges on the door. Not only tools are useful in our lives but 
also other people. This is because we live in a social world in which we are dependent on 
other individuals. For example, if somebody notices that he forgot to buy eggs needed to 
make a cake for his wife’s birthday he might decide to ask the neighbor for some eggs. 
 
1.4 Phenomenology in archaeology 
 
Archaeologists are intrigued by Heidegger’s ideas about human experience as a 
process of creating meaning. His conception that human experience is connected to 
individual life history and to a larger sense of belonging to a social group is deemed 
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important to understand the archaeological record phenomenologically. Heidegger’s 
ideas about spatiality in terms of meaningful space as opposed to measured space 
resonate with archaeologists. The idea here is that we experience space in terms of 
personal meaning attached to a specific space. Many archaeologists like the idea of a 
connection between mind and body as presented in phenomenological thought (Tilley 
1994: 1-34; Thomas 2006). 
Husserlian phenomenology is largely ignored by archaeologists even though his 
approach bears potential for archaeological interpretation because Husserl’s idea of 
general structures of human experience could help to understand past human experience 
from the archaeological record. Husserl’s examples reference physical objects which 
correlate with the experience of the archaeologist who is confronted with material 
remains. This connection to the material and the potential for general structures 
underlying human experience could be tested experimentally. 
One of the most recent advances in phenomenology is a naturalized 
phenomenology (Yoshimi 2016: 287) that builds on a realist concept of the world as 
physically present. This is the view that natural science offers us the best theory of the 
world we have, and that we should use its method to pursue truth. It is related with other 
philosophical views, such as positivism, empiricism and physicalism, which remain 
separate concepts. Naturalized phenomenology is an approach that eliminates the anti-
natural part of phenomenology and integrates phenomenology into the natural sciences, 
the cognitive sciences in particular. 
An interdisciplinary methodology for a naturalized phenomenology assumes 
equal importance for every discipline involved. This means developments in cognitive 
science, psychology, and phenomenology lead to revision in the other fields (Yoshimi 
2016: 294). Naturalized phenomenology supports the use of personal experience in 
archaeological interpretation. Further, it suggests that human experience can be studied 
under an empiricist paradigm. This connects with Wundt’s careful methodology of 
introspection as a way to understand human psychology (Danziger 1980). 
In archaeology experimentation is possible through experimental archaeology and 
through connection with psychology and the cognitive sciences. This is important 
because data can be acquired which could help to investigate if there are potential 
similarities in shaping human experience. Further, there are fundamental basics of human 
experience through physics and common human biology which are based in the physical 
world.  
Human biology and physical processes are connected to the body which forms the 
nexus of human experience. Biology describes the composition and limitations of our 
very bodies while physical processes act on our body such as for example gravity. The 
body is important for a naturalized phenomenology because only our bodies enable us to 
interact with the physical world.  
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Contemporary archaeologists draw mainly on Heidegger as a source for 
phenomenological theory. Phenomenology in archaeology is primarily employed in 
landscape archaeology. Here, the focus is on human constructedness of the natural 
environment. Large monuments such as pyramids, megalithic structures, and mounds are 
traditionally the object of study within a phenomenological interpretative frame. 
Archaeologists use phenomenological methods to study the past as embodied in the 
present. This means that the objective is to understand how past people might have 
experienced the landscape. Another focus of phenomenology in archaeology is centered 
on the creation of place which is thought to be embodied and constructed (Tuan 1977; 
Casey 1996). 
Christopher Tilley (2010) is one of the earliest archaeologists to employ 
phenomenology in archaeology. His first book on the topic was A Phenomenology of 
Landscape published in 1994. In this book Tilley interpreted megalithic period 
monuments in England by walking through the landscape noting his impressions, which 
he then assumed to be comparable to what people in the past experienced. Tilley was 
using his own experience with the landscape to understand the past. To get a feeling for 
Tilley’s phenomenology note this excerpt: 
 
The general outlines and configurations of the chalk down lands are more or less 
uniform. This effect is ‘to create an illusion of infinite distance by the repetition 
of like forms’, giving an illusion of a landscape without limits. However, it is the 
variation of detail within the general law of the downlands shapes that perennially 
refreshes the eye. Obedience to this law allows within its folds for a multiform 
diversity in the patterns of the hills as they pass (2010: 61). 
 
This example illustrates that Tilley is trying to capture the experience of the 
landscape in almost literary description. Tilley’s approach is centered on the recent 
experience of landscape not the past. The recent experiences are then used to describe the 
potential experience of people of the Neolithic period. Tilley’s description of the 
landscape is focused on what the landscape suggests to the observer. In this quote 
distance is identified as the feature that this landscape evokes. Those descriptions are 
supported by many photographs of the described landscape formations which aim to 
transport Tilley’s experience to the reader.  
Julian Thomas (1996) explores phenomenology for archaeologists in a different 
manner than Tilley. Thomas’ phenomenological approach attempts to connect with the 
archaeological record more than Tilley’s. Thomas counters the notion of Cartesianism 
which assumes a sharp distinction between nature and culture. Thomas argues that 
Cartesianism is the basis for processual archaeology and that archaeologists have to break 
free from a Cartesian understanding of the world to be able to capture the experiences of 
past peoples. In Thomas words: 
 
The principal elements of this perspective are the categorical distinctions which 
are drawn between mind and body, and culture and nature. Both of this 
antinomies, I will suggest, are of relatively recent origin, and in their more 
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developed forms are peculiarities of a western, metaphysical habit of thought 
(Thomas 1996: 11). 
 
For Thomas, Cartesianism is deeply ingrained in Western thinking and that other 
cultures in the past did not understand the world on the same terms as those in the 
present. Therefore, it is not useful for archaeologists to simply use recent thought and 
experience as a direct analogue to infer past people’s experience. To come closer to 
understanding this experience we have to break with our own pattern of thought to be 
able to make our experience today more akin to that of the past (Thomas 1996). This is 
not dissimilar to Collingwood’s notion of putting oneself into a historical mode. 
Thomas argues that scientific methodology in archaeology introduces ethical 
problems. Archaeology under a strict empiricist paradigm is focused on formulating 
general rules of human behavior. Past behavior is complex and diverse which means that 
the formal rules about past behavior can quickly amount to totalization (Thomas 2000). 
Further, the role of the archaeologist as an active agent of western knowledge production 
has to be understood reflexively to avoid colonizing tendencies in archaeological 
interpretation. Processual approaches to archaeology can lead to the reduction of past life 
worlds to the material remains (Thomas 2008). Thomas’ point is well-taken, but, this 
polarized view does not account for human regularities and similarities not only in the 
past but among contemporary peoples as well. While human cultures and individuals do 
exhibit diversity, there are also many similarities among people cross culturally and in 
their cultural adaptations. 
Andrew Fleming critiques Christopher Tilley in Phenomenology and the 
Megaliths of Wales (1999) claiming Tilley uses his own subjective experience as data. 
Fleming points to the lack of scientific standards exhibited by Tilley’s approach. Fleming 
especially argues that the megalithic structures of South-West Wales are not as uniform 
as Tilley describes them since they are altered due to weathering and other processes. 
Changes based on weathering cause the structures to appear more similar than they are. 
Therefore, the megalithic architecture is not necessarily intentional or ascribable to a 
common understanding between the builders of those structures. Fleming further points 
out that there is differential conservation in play, which leads to a situation in which the 
structures positioned on the least desirable land are most likely to have survived over 
time. This makes it difficult to make claims about the builder’s goals by using spatial 
relationships as they are represented by the archaeological evidence.  
Aaron Watson and David Keating (1999) expand Tilley’s phenomenological 
approach to include auditory experiences whereas Tilley was focused on visual 
experience. Watson and Keating argue that Tilley focuses too much on visual experience 
to the exclusion of other modalities such as audition. They did test at a tomb and a stone 
circle measuring the acoustic properties of each of the selected locations, and concluded 
that the stone circle had acoustic properties comparable to a theatre. Furthermore, Watson 
and Keating combine the acoustic results with the visual impression of the site. They 
argue that the visual and auditory experience combined makes the stone circle a good 
place for communal activities. The acoustic data from the intact megalithic tomb 
structure is very complex, which would have allowed for a multitude of different acoustic 
experiences for people visiting the tomb.  
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Vicki Cummings (2000; 2002a; 2002b; Cummings and Watson 2002; Cummings 
and Whittle 2003) did a series of studies focusing on British and the prehistoric 
landscapes and monuments. Cummings is involved in digital exploration of past 
landscapes which are computer based and visual. This departs from Tilley in the sense 
that for Tilley the individual experience of the researcher is enough and no mediation 
from technology is needed for the phenomenological process in archaeology. The use of 
computer reconstructions has some advantages because the possible experience of the 
monuments can be made accessible to a broader public. Computer reconstructions could 
be used as the basis for further examination through future generations of researchers. 
Tilley’s discontent with using modern technology discourages its use in archaeological 
practice. However, Cummings demonstrates that phenomenology can be combined with 
technology and that computer reconstructions can help researchers to better understand 
the experience people might have had within a location, landscape, or monument.  
Joanna Brück (2005) argues that phenomenology is important because 
understanding past human experience is central to the archaeological project. However, 
using the self of the researcher to draw conclusions about the lived experience of the past 
is problematic in many ways. Tilley for example assumes constancy in landscape which 
is not congruent with the fact that landscapes change especially through the long-time 
frames archeologists study. Further, there is the danger of simply projecting our modern 
sensibilities and culture back into the past. Phenomenology is useful in opening the 
discipline to modes of interpreting the past which takes into account past experience 
(Brück 2005). 
This is important because the discipline has been traditionally centered along the 
lines of a scientific paradigm expressing the past in artifact and feature measurements.. 
Earlier scientifically-centered approaches treated the past as disembodied. But, the body 
is central to the human experience because humans are not disembodied beings and are 
physically connected with the world through the body. Moreover, the human body allows 
for human agency in the world which forms an important dimension of human experience 
(Brück 2005). 
Sue Hamilton et. al (2006) reacts to the critique of the lack of rigor and 
subjectivity in most phenomenological work in archaeology. Hamilton tries to find a 
methodology for phenomenology in archaeology that connects it to the archaeological 
record. To achieve this goal Hamilton includes traditional archaeological frames of 
interpretation into her phenomenologically based work. The more traditional methods are 
focused on economy, environmental reconstruction and the analysis of the technology. 
Hamilton also tries to focus on the everyday rather than the large-scale structures and 
ritualistic sites to gain a clearer understanding of the daily experience in the past. This 
approach helps to make the life experience of the average individual visible in the 
archaeological record. Furthermore, the combination of traditional modes of 
interpretation and analysis could potentially ameliorate the perceived lack of rigor as for 
example in Tilley’s approach.   
Ruth Van Dyke (2007; 2011) uses a phenomenological approach to study the 
pueblo sites of Chaco Canyon New Mexico. Van Dyke argues that intervisibility between 
sites was one of the most important features of the Chacoan people because of orientation 
on the arid plateau and that accessibility was regulated through the topography of the 
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canyon and artificial manipulations which created paths. Through this the movement 
through Chaco Canyon was only practical on certain routes, which helps to shape a 
certain experience of the site since the routes are restricting some views while supporting 
others. 
Van Dyke acknowledges that archaeologists cannot simply transport their own 
experiences in the field to the past because the landscape and pueblos had certain 
symbolic meaning attached for the Chacoan people. To arrive at a better correlate Van 
Dyke draws on ethnographic data from the region to get a hint about the symbolic 
meaning of the landscape and the architecture. This is especially important because 
interpretations of Chaco canyon are contested. Van Dyke seems to highlight a more 
rigorous approach including mapping of the area and map-based analysis (2007; 2011). 
Christopher Tilley (2008a, 2008b) broadened the geographic scope of his 
phenomenology in archaeology in the two volumes of Explorations in Landscape 
Phenomenology. These books are focused on prehistoric monuments of Northern Europe. 
Tilley employs his subjective method of exploring the landscapes and noting the 
impressions which are connected to this experience and applies those insights to the 
prehistoric past. Tilley is further developing his type of phenomenological understanding 
of the past by applying the technique to other areas foremost in northern Europe. It is 
interesting that although Tilley has expanded the scope of his phenomenology he still 
does not address the critics of his method effectively. The main difficulties with Tilley’s 
phenomenological archaeology are the lack of rigor is still an issue and he is still 
bracketing out audio experiences, smell and other sense and is focusing on the visual and 
spatial arrangements.  
In general, criticism leveled at a phenomenological approach is based on the 
ability of archaeologists to understand the archaeological record without taking 
reconstructions into account. Critics are also uncomfortable with self reflective 
methodologies used to infer human experience of people of the past. Yet, there are ways 
to address these issues. First, reconstructions and experimentation can help to better 
understand the human past based on modern experience of the archaeological record. 
Second, Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) phenomenology, suggests that we can safely infer 
human experience if it is grounded in environmental or material cultures. This adds 
constraint to our understanding of past human experience. 
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The use of analogy is central to archaeological interpretations. Analogies allow 
archaeologists to infer past people’s behavior as revealed in the archaeological record. 
This is because material remains in themselves do not contain enough information to 
determine complex human behavior such as the development and enforcement of 
hierarchies and social institutions over time (Chapman 2003; Taylor 1874; Boas 1982). 
Analogies connect observable or described behaviors with people of the past. For 
instance, they may be used to infer on conflict, building activities, or the function of 
objects (Arkush and Stanish 2005; McIntosh 1974; Talalay 1987; Friesen 2002; Brown 
2004; Berrocal 2011; Bernadini 1999) 
Analogies require a target, a source and a connection between both. The source of 
the analogy is based on a human group that is either documented historically or 
ethnographically. In some cases the source of an analogy can be an existing human group 
which can be studied by researchers directly. Archaeologists bring their own experiences 
and conceptualizations to archaeological interpretation. The target of an analogy is to 
understand the archaeological record exceeding the provided data. Alison Wylie (1989) 
differentiates between two forms of analogy: formal analogies are related to similarities 
of form, while relational analogs are based on connections between human groups over 
time and space. 
Gould critiqued the use of analogy in archaeology because there are no definite 
general laws, to infer cultural patterns. In contrast the natural sciences can work with a 
set of empirical laws which allows researchers to infer processes over time such as is the 
case in geology. For instance, geologists have a relatively clear understanding of the 
formation of different sedimentary layers to reconstruct the geological landscape (Gould 
and Watson 1982). 
There are, however, some experiences which seem to be fundamental to the 
human existence such as the experience that fire is hot or that humans cannot fly. These 
fundamental similarities of human experience can be the foundation for analogies. 
Analogy cannot explain the past but can help to understand past human experience. 
Without some form of analogy it is not possible to interpret the archaeological record 
meaningfully. This is one reason that analogy has a long tradition in anthropological 
thought. 
In the Americas in the early 20th century the Direct Historical Approach (DHA) 
became the frame for building analogies for the interpretation of the archaeological past. 
The assumption for the DHA was that there little of temporal depth in American 
archaeology. It was stipulated that populations of the past as accessed through the 
archaeological record can be connected to the ethnographically studied groups of the 
present time. (Lyman and O’Brien 2001: 308).  
Processual archaeologists argued that formal and relational analogies are the basis 
for hypotheses formation. Hypotheses have to be rigorously tested against the 
archaeological record for verification or falsification. One of the most well known figures 
in processual archeology is Lewis Binford (1967) who argued that analogy could be used 
to direct archaeological inquiry based on the archaeological record. In Binford’s 
understanding analogy can only be usefully employed to contribute new hypothesis for 
further testing. Binford focuses on one type of analogy based on the form and function of 
an object. Binford suggested a list of qualities a good analogy should have: 
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1. The recognition and demonstration of a positive formal analogy 
between a class of archaeologically observed phenomena and a class of 
ethnographically observed phenomena.  
2.  Consideration of the positive analogy between the spatial 
distribution of the facility as documented archaeologically and 
ethnographically, and the observation that, although poorly documented, the 
known distributions show a strong positive analogy. 
3.  Consideration to the degree of which it would be reasonable to 
expect a continuity between the archaeologically and ethnographically 
known cases; for example the dating of the archaeologically known 
materials as reasonably viewed as cases of historical priority to the 
ethnographic data (Binford 1967: 9). 
 
The excerpt shows that Binford is mostly interested in formal analogies between 
ethnographically observed use and production of materials such as tools and the 
corresponding archaeological remains. More general assumptions about cultural 
properties and development are not formally recognized in Binford’s construction of 
archaeological analogy. Binford’s repeated use of the term “observed” highlights his 
interest in adopting a scientific methodology for archaeology (Trigger 1989: 394).  
Alison Wylie (1989: 12-16) rehabilitated analogy as an integral part of 
archaeological interpretation against processual critiques. Wylie calls for the use of 
multiple strands of inference as a way of falsifying analogies, that do not archaeological 
data, or are not the best fitting explanation, eliminating the need for formal hypothesis 
testing. This requires a potentially interdisciplinary approach. Further, Wylie suggests 
that analogies are constrained by the archaeological record itself, and argues that 
analogies can be at least partially be constrained by empirical evidence. Wylie identifies 
an effective strategy to defend the use of analogy in archaeology from over 
generalization, suggesting that analogies should be smaller in scope such as to cover 
specific types of behavior. Wylie illustrates her concept with the cable and tacking 
metaphor. The cables stand for a non-linear process of reasoning connecting with 
different sources such as ethnographic, historic or psychological evidence. Wylie 
describes her understanding of tacking as follows: 
 
Whatever its specific aims, archaeological interpretation depends on 
background knowledge of contemporary contexts; usually it proceeds by 
means of ethnographic analogy. It is therefore explicitly and heavily 
dependent on vertical tack arguments within the source context (broadly 
construed) which produce both experience-distant concepts - general 
theories about cultural development, differentiation, interaction, and 
adaptation – and experience near models of specific past contexts (Wylie 
1989: 11). 
 
This is interesting because Wylie incorporates the concept of generalized 
analogies of early anthropologists and archaeologists instead of excluding such a notion. 
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Wylie acknowledges the importance of some general assumptions for archaeological 
analogies because they are necessary to link documented source behavior to the 
archaeological record. The main burden of theory testing is focused on the experience 
near models which can potentially be tested through the archaeological record. 
Stahl (1993: 236-237) argues that analogies can be used to fill in the gaps 
archaeologists experience in connection with the archaeological record. This requires that 
archaeologists have some sense about applicable analogs for the case in question. He 
suggests that sources of analogies need to be critically investigated to achieve better 
quality analogs. Further, he argues that researchers have to be careful in selecting sources 
for analogs especially when so called traditional societies are involved. 
 
3.1 Experimental Archaeology 
 
Experimental archaeology is a useful technique in order to build experience-near 
analogies connected to the specificities of the archaeological context. Experimental 
archaeologists try to replicate as closely as possible the creation of artifacts and the 
techniques involved in this process. In some cases experimental archaeologists 
reconstruct whole structures and settlements. They are also interested in the kinds of 
objects used in the past and in the specific techniques were used in their production.  
There are different forms of experimental archaeology. Mathieu (2002: 2) offers a 
typology of experimental archaeology. He differentiates between “object replication” 
(Plison 1983; Beyries; 1978; LeMoine 2002; Bienenfield 1995; d’Erico et al. 1982; 
Hillson 1992; Cross et al. 2002; Greenfield 2002; Walker 1978). “behavioral replication” 
(2002: 3; Mathieu and Meyer 2002), “process replication” and “system replication” 
(2002; 6). Object replication attempts to reproduce past objects. Behavioral reproduction 
replicates aspects of past behavior. Process replication is concerned with replicating 
taphonomic processes which shape the archaeological record. System replication involves 
ethnographic data in order to replicate on the systemic level including large scale social 
experiments (Mathieu 2002; Ammerman and Cavalli-Sforza 1984 Binford 1977; 
Flannery 1986). Another category is “phenomenological studies” (Mathieu 2002: 4). 
Phenomenological studies try to replicate past human experience (Forte and Siliotti 1997; 
Tilley 1994; Sanders 1990; Watson and Keating 1999; Vranich 2002; Rasmussen and 
Gronnow 1999). 
In Archaeology of the Senses, Yannis Hamilakis (2014: 61, 161) tries to 
understand the experience of humans in the context of burial practices in Bronze Age 
Greece. The focus is on the sensuality of human experience. Hamilakis uses his personal 
experiences with the cinema and with food in order to build a sensory analogy for Bronze 
Age Crete. Hamilakis suggests that the cinematic experience is more than just visual but 
rather includes the experience of the movie music, and activity of the audience such as 
laughing or crying. Hamilakis suggests that people in Bronze Age Crete did not only 
visually experience the burial chamber but that they also interacted with the dead. The 
place was probably crowded and various odors were part of the experience (2014: 161). 
Ultimately archaeologists and also the general public are interested in the 
meaning past material remains had to past human groups. In order to gain more than a 
detailed inventory of measurements and use-wear analyses analogy is required. In many 
24 
 
cases ethnographic analogy seems to be a good fit to explain some aspects of the 
archaeological record because the ethnographic record is fairly extensive covering 
populations which are potentially close to the past target population either 
geographically, culturally or temporally (Sanger 1996; Hegmon 2000; Siegel 1990; 
Atherton 1983). Sometimes historical analogies could work better than ethnographic 
correlates because of wide temporal range of historical sources that overlap to a certain 
extent with the archaeological record. Historical sources are in parts well studied and 
critically analyzed by history as an academic discipline. The advantage is that 
archaeologists can build on history as a discipline in order to contextualize and 
understand historical circumstances (Howell and Prevenier 2001). 
 
3.2 Different Strands of Inference 
 
Ethnography and history are not the only possibilities for archaeologists to 
construct potential analogues. This connection between behavior and material remains 
can be studied through experimentation (Sheetah 2008; Johnson and Olson 1992; 
Shennan 2002; Wynn 2009). The advantage of experimental archaeology is that it allows 
for a controlled situation comparable to laboratory experiments (Schiffer and Skibo 1990; 
Brandt et al. 1992; Eren and Lycett 2016). In the controlled environment, archaeologists 
are able to keep surrounding factors constant while some parameters might be changed in 
order to gain a better understanding of some past behavior.  
Experimental archaeology can be extended to encompass more aspects of past 
people’s life world than focusing predominantly on strictly behavioral questions about 
tool use and production. Experimental archaeology opens up the possibility for testing 
assumptions about past human experience. For instance, in trying to understand ancient 
ritual cave use Moyes and her colleagues (2015) studied the impact of darkness on the 
experience of the supernatural. The experiment featured two conditions, a small room 
with a window and a small dark room. Participants in both conditions were asked to 
answer questions concerning odd circumstances or coincidences. In the dark room 
condition participants were more statistically more likely to identify supernatural causes 
to explain these events suggesting that darkness influences peoples interpretations. There 
are further studies concerning the role of darkness in human experience (Boutsikas 2015; 
Goodison 2015) and studies involving light and shadow (Bosch 2015; Dawson and Levy 
2015). These authors achieved similar results indicating intentional use of light and 
shadow in past structures. Studies in human cognition such as these can have 
archaeological implications regarding not only how dark space is used, but why dark 
areas are chosen for particular activities. 
 
3.3 Human Experience as Analogy 
 
Human experience is a special form of analogy. The source of an experiential 
analogy is human experience which can be used to infer past human experience. Some of 
the criteria suggested for identifying good analogies might be applied to access human 
experience as analog. Cultural similarity might for example be established for human 
experience through experimentation with a diverse population (different sex gender and 
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age groups). Experimental analogy allows us to experience similar conditions as in the 
past. Temporal similarity might not be as important to evaluate human experience 
because some aspects of human experience might be similar enough especially on a basic 
level. Similarities in space can be explored by experiential studies with participants from 
different regions of the world. Formal analogies could be translated to human experience 
in the sense that pithouses were probably warmer than sleeping outside. A dead animal 
smelled probably as decaying cadavers do today. Judgments about a sensation might be 
subjective but the experience itself exists. Human experience past and present is 
mitigated through our bodies and the resulting opportunities and limitations to interact 
with the world our bodily structure seems to be similar enough to suggest relatedness in 
experience.  
The use of analogy would strengthen the human aspect of archaeological work in 
two ways. First, the use of analogy allows us to go beyond measurements of artifacts and 
features and other quantitative descriptors of the archaeological record. Second, the open 
use of analogy allows for the expertise of the scholar to understand the archaeological 
material. Our humanity is the common link between humans over time in the sense that 
all human groups which existed or exist share common features because they are 
members of the human species which contains a set of behavioral, physiological and 
psychological features which differentiates humans from other species (Bastian 1868). 
Analogy may allow archaeologists to understand more about past people’s 
cognitive/ sensorial experience. Human experience is characterized by behavior and 
related material remains but also by the feelings, motivations and representations which 
are all aspects of mental processes. Phenomenology can lead to new forms of analogy 
based in shared human experience. However, in other cases we understand past human 
experience through imagination based on shared knowledge or similar experience. 
Phenomenological analogies based on human experience will allow us to 
transcend the innate blanks in the material record. This requires strong analogies which 
are based on similar context (environment, culture) and in formal similarities of 
archaeological experiences. Through experimentation we may not only replicate certain 
behaviors such as tool making but can also replicate the experience.  
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Chapter 4 
Theory of Mind (ToM) 
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This chapter explores the possibilities Theory of Mind (ToM) offers to bolster 
archaeological interpretations that seek to understand past human experience. ToM is 
connected to our human cognitive structure and is part of our social experience of the 
world (Goldman 2012). ToM seeks to explain the mechanism that allows us to 
understand other individuals’ cognitive/sensorial experience based on their behaviors. 
The theory helps to justify phenomenological approaches because it offers a path to 
understand commonalities in human experience based on our mental and biological 
structure and allows archaeologists to use their own experience to build models (or what 
may be thought of as analogies) about past human experience. Imagination is important 
for ToM to be useful for understanding the archaeological record. Under everyday life 
conditions ToM seems to yield results that help humans operate in social settings 
(Thomas and Fletcher 2003). This property of human cognition supports a self reflective 
attitude used by scholars to understand the human past. 
In order to understand other individuals we need to infer their mental processes, 
because behavior can have multiple related states of mind attached to it (Frith and Frith 
2005). For example, if somebody is crying it could be related to pain or it might be 
related to sadness or frustration. Furthermore, someone might cry about something which 
is not present but is remembered. We have to know something about the processes 
involved in cognition, which seems to include potential mental states. This means we 
have to know ourselves first before we are able to understand others. The founding 
philosophers of phenomenology argue that everyday experiences in the real world allow 
us to access our own mental processes through personal experience or introspection 
(Husserl 1982; Heidegger 2008). 
ToM is labeled in numerous ways often referred to as “folk psychology.” The 
basic notion is that humans have a basic understanding for other peoples’ mental states 
(Sellars 1956). There are various ideas about the specific mechanisms of theory of mind 
(ToM). The two main accounts are theory-theory (Fodor 1987; Churchland 1981) and 
simulation-theory. Theory-theory (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986) suggests that humans 
generate hypotheses about other peoples’ states of mind and then test these hypotheses by 
observing the behavior of the target in question. The hypothesis is then either rejected or 
accepted depending on the fit between behavior and hypothesis. In the case a hypothesis 
is rejected another hypothesis is generated and tested until a satisfactory match between 
hypothesis and observed behavior is achieved. Theory-theory suggests a structured 
process connected to ToM. 
Simulation-theory on the other hand argues that humans simulate other peoples’ 
mental states through replicating mental process (Goldman 1989). However, this is not a 
complete account of all the various conceptions which exist to understand ToM. Further, 
both theory-theory and simulation-theory and other similar accounts will be useful for 
phenomenological archaeology. This is because ToM suggests that we can infer human 
thought and feelings of others in order to be able to work on a phenomenology of human 
experience in the past. Both modes of ToM theory-theory and simulation theory are 
maximized with increased information, which fits well with archaeological pursuits. 
Analogically, we expect that the more knowledge an archaeologist has in relation to a 
respective area of study, the stronger their interpretations of past cognitive/sensorial 
experiences will be. 
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It is possible to statistically support the effect of prior knowledge on ToM quality 
through the use of Bayesian statistics. Bayesian statistics are based on the idea that our 
current assumptions about the world we hold are informed by prior beliefs and are 
updated with empirical data. They allow researchers to formalize the effect of prior 
knowledge on ToM. This is important because it suggests that prior knowledge is able to 
improve ToM based interpretations of cognitive/ sensorial experience. Bayesian statistics 
allow us to better theorize and formalize ToM (Poldrack 2011). This allows us to 
understand how prior knowledge improves the understanding of the archaeologist. 
ToM is useful for understanding past human cognitive/sensorial experience from 
the archaeological record because ToM is part of our evolutionary heritage. ToM is 
present in a number of non-human primates but is especially well developed in human 
cognition (Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs 2006). This suggests that ToM works for the human 
species well enough to be selected for. Otherwise ToM would not have become a 
prominent feature of the human mind (Trivers 1971). Our understanding of other 
individual’s cognitive/sensorial experience is accurate enough to understand their 
behavior and motivation. 
There is evidence that ToM is important for social relations in complex group 
organizations based on anatomy (Aiello and Wheeler 1995; Rilling and Insel 1999) and a 
correlation between neo-cortex and average group size (Dunbar 2003). This suggests that 
ToM evolved to cope with the challenges of complex social structures as formed by 
humans (Humphrey 1976). The argument is made that ToM is important for cheater 
detection in order to stabilize social groups and to ensure that the benefits of social 
cooperation outweigh its costs (Trivers 1971). 
ToM could potentially be connected with brain activity, thereby grounding ToM 
in human biology (Kramer and Erickson 2007; Haynes and Rees 2006; Just et al. 1999; 
Smith et al. 2002; Posner 2003, Van Honk et al. 2010, Norman et al. 2006; Saxe 2006; 
Charlton et al. 2009; Charman et al. 2000). The correlation between ToM and brain 
function seems strong enough to suggest a connection between the two. This is important 
because biological evolution requires organic correlates. This supports evolutionary 
arguments concerning ToM in humans. Further, the correlation between brain activity 
and ToM suggests that we have a natural imperative to employ ToM, which suggests that 
it is a way and perhaps the only way for archaeologists to understand past human 
experience. Biological and psychological research concerning human perception can be 
useful to further bolster our understanding of human experience. G. T. Buswell (1935) 
studied the perception of painting of participants. Lucia Vaina et al. (2001) studied brain 
structures involved in the identification of biological movements. 
Douglas Frye (1995) suggests that characteristic difficulties of young children in 
ToM tasks could be best explained by a theory-theory based mechanism of ToM in 
humans. This means that ToM might be rule based and methodological which connects 
with archaeological reasoning and interpretation. Further, experimentation is this 
direction may allow us to formulate some of the rules which are part of ToM. This would 
enable archaeologists to self-reflectively understand the processes which lead to their 
understanding of the past. Archaeologists have to draw on other disciplines such as the 
cognitive sciences and psychology to understand the possibilities and difficulties of ToM 
in regards to inferring past human experience.  
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Interpretations of past people’s cognitive states can be improved by 
archaeological knowledge and training, leading to increasingly better estimates over time. 
Studies concerning the improvement of ToM abilities in children for educational 
purposes indicate that ToM can be trained (Kloo and Perner 2008). The ever growing 
amount of archaeological data can also be part of prior knowledge as captured in the 
Bayesian statistics (Poldrack 2011; Gopnik and Wellman 2012). This would mean that a 
growing amount of archaeological data would eventually decrease error in ToM applied 
to the archaeological record so that  self-reflectivity of the archaeologist in the field 
concerning prior knowledge can be used to improve the quality of our understanding of 
the past. Therefore, ToM suggests that we can understand other people’s cognitive/ 
sensorial experience to a certain degree. This means that Tilley’s approach of inferring 
past experience is viable but needs to be bolstered by reconstruction and experimentation 
(Reindel 2009, Bruno et al. 2010, Ducke et al. 2011, Forte et al. 2012; Siart et al. 2008; 
Alexakis et al. 2011; Tarasov et al. 2006; Schoeninger and Moore 1992). 
Through ToM archaeology can take part in a larger phenomenological endeavor 
of understanding the human experience connecting archaeology more strongly with 
anthropology and the humanities in general. ToM brings back a certain control of 
archaeological interpretation to the archaeologist instead of placing too much emphasis 
on computers, modern measurement equipment and the archaeological record. This does 
not mean that modern technologies and the archaeological record are not of utmost 
importance, but rather that emphasizing technology and materiality over the cognitive 
aspects of the archaeological past needs to be nuanced. 
ToM suggests that humans are able to understand other peoples experience 
through inferring on human behavior (Dunn 2000) and may be extended to infer the 
experience of people in the past. This does not mean that ToM leads always to a true 
understanding of human experience but often enough because it is an adaptive part of 
human consciousness (Thomas and Fletcher 2003). Further, our ability to understand 
other individuals can be trained and improves through practice and accumulation 
knowledge about human behavior (Goldstein and Winner 2012).  
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Chapter 5 
The Importance of Phenomenology in 
Archaeology 
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Without interpretative paradigms archaeologists are very limited in explaining 
broader individual and cultural implications suggested by the archaeological record. 
There is a plethora of different interpretational frames for interpreting archaeological data 
(Trigger 1989; Bird and O’Connell 2012; LaMotta 2012; Renfrew 2012; Thomas 2012; 
Hamilakis 2014; Tilley 1994; Johnsen and Olsen 1992; Gillings 2012; Wheatley 1995) 
that try to gain insights into the experience of past peoples by reconstructing past life 
worlds. Processual and post-processual archaeologies allow us to understand some 
aspects of human experience. The problem with processual approaches is that a strictly 
scientific approach is too restrictive for understanding experience. Post-processual 
schools on the other hand deny similarities in human experience which is necessary to 
infer past human life worlds meaningfully.  
Archaeologists need phenomenological frameworks to understand past human 
experience. Currently, no algorithm is capable of understanding human experience in the 
past. It seems likely that humans are the best approximations for past human populations 
because of their shared humanity. Since its inception, phenomenology has been critiqued, 
revised, and proposed under different schools of thought such as “sensory” archaeology.  
Inventing new names for essentially phenomenological archaeology will lead the 
archaeological project astray from the humane quality which is common to all of 
humanity which also encompasses past human groups. 
The appeal of phenomenology in archaeology is that it allows archaeologists to 
stay connected with qualities shared by humans. This inhibits a formulaic approach to 
archaeological interpretation. Archaeology can contribute to questions about what exactly 
makes humans human and about the human experience, allowing archaeologists to reach 
a more holistic understanding of the past. Experiences of past peoples can be understood 
which allows for insights into their motivations, feelings, goals and limitations. That is 
important because holism is a central part of the anthropological enterprise (Bubandt and 
Otto 2010). Archaeology as part of anthropology should be able to contribute to the 
broader spectrum of anthropological work. Otherwise past life worlds are reduced to 
what can be inferred directly through the material remains such as studies of subsistence, 
modes of produciton and technology (Bright et al. 2002; Borrero and Franco 1997). This 
implies that human experience and human intentions are not relevant to archaeological 
research. 
The basic properties of the world can help archaeologists to understand the 
experience of people in the past. The basic laws of physics have not changed, for 
example. An individual in the past would have had a similar basic experience of his mass, 
and would also experience falling when stumbling over a rock. Further, it is safe to 
assume that fire radiates heat and that this was true in the past as well as it is true for the 
present. Past humans who experienced fire should have had a similar basic heat 
experience when near a fire, which affects human behavior. The human body is a 
physical object in itself and shapes the possibilities humans have concerning their life 
world. The body is the center of human interaction with the world and affords certain 
movements and manipulations while others are not possible or discouraged (Merleau-
Ponty 1962). He suggests that the human body is the center of our experience because we 
interact with the world through our bodies and Husserlian phenomenology suggests that 
there are certain structures of human experience which could potentially be generalized 
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(Varela et al. 2017). Human anatomy has remained basically similar over time (with 
phenotypic changes), which offers the possibility that we share at least some of the basic 
commonalities of bodily experience (Klein 1995). Humans past and present might not be 
as different as post-processual thought assumes. This allows researchers to infer past 
human interactions with the world because human anatomy allows for certain movements 
but not others (Withagen et al. 2012). For example, experimental archaeology can be 
used to test if a door was actually high enough for people to pass through. Human 
experience is only meaningful through the nexus of the body oriented in space and time. I 
would argue that phenomenology in archaeology as practiced by Tilley (1994) goes too 
far in rejecting processual archaeology. An understanding of past human experience 
should be constrained by the archaeological record in order to create a better field for 
understanding humans embedded in their life worlds. Further, the connection between 
past and present human experience as assumed by Tilley would become stronger through 
better reconstruction of contexts through processual techniques among others. 
Experiential archaeology requires some extensions to conceptions of 
philosophical phenomenology. First phenomenology in archaeology is concerned with 
deep time. Husserlian phenomenology deals with the individual human life span and his 
examples are often even more temporally limited. Heideggerian phenomenology is also 
focused on the individual human time span. However, the concept of historicity connects 
individual human experience to larger historical frame. Second phenomenology in 
archaeology has to incorporate archaeological data as the basis for interpretation. This 
means that an archaeological phenomenology is rooted in philosophical phenomenology 
but is not the same. This means that archaeologists have to be careful in using concepts of 
philosophical phenomenology because some of them might not be accessible to 
archaeological research. For example Heidegger’s ideas of authenticity are difficult to 
infer from the archaeological record. (Brück 2005). 
Phenomenological archaeology can be bolstered by experimental archaeology, 
because experimental archaeology can help to link behavior to the material record and it 
is even possible in experimentation to gain insights into experience. Archeological 
experiments do not have to be extremely complex in order to produce phenomenological 
knowledge. Consider for example March and his colleagues’ (2014) experiment in which 
different forms of campfires were built in a place, which reassembles as closely as 
possible that found in the archaeological record. Experimental archaeologists should be 
able to experience some of the basic qualities related to the different forms of campfires. 
Some of the campfires for example might be brighter or dimmer or warmer or colder. 
Moreover, such basic phenomenological observations should yield relatively exact 
approximations of past peoples’ experiences with such campfires (March et al. 2014). 
Cognitive science can help archaeologists to better understand the similarities in 
human experience. Whereas post-processual archaeologists tend to focus too much on the 
differences of human experience, cognitive science is able to tie some aspects of human 
experience to brain functions. Emerson et al. (2014) connects pain sensitivity to certain 
brain regions. Kawabata and Zeki (2004). suggest that through MRI imaging it is possible 
to identify brain regions with higher activity in participants viewing paintings which the 
participants categorize as beautiful. As the phenomenologist’s argue, humans’ posses 
some distinct qualities which constitute their humanity. Bastian (1868) uses the term 
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Humane to describe the uniqueness of the human experience which is fundamental to the 
human life world. The human life world is in some aspects different from the animal life 
world in many cases not in quality but in quantity. For example, humans are much more 
invested in symbol systems than other animals.  
Through phenomenology archaeology can work with cognitive science (Coolidge 
2014) and psychology (Ingold 1998) in order to better understand the processes 
underlying human experience. To create experiential analogs with the past, ToM suggests 
that it is possible for humans to read other minds and infer intentions, though accuracy 
often depends on cultural and individual knowledge. This suggests that it is possible to 
use a reflexivity that is contextualized and bolstered by archaeological data. 
Human experience allows archaeologists to combine archaeological traditions 
such as the use of analogy with specific knowledge and insights that archaeologists 
obtain concerning their respective areas of expertise combined with insights from other 
disciplines (Tilley 1994). Phenomenology in archaeology is an effective pathway to 
understanding past people’s experiences, which makes it irreplaceable. With a 
phenomenological understanding of the past, archaeology as a discipline can become 
meaningful for scholars and the general public alike. However, a properly theorized 
synthesis of existing methodologies is necessary. 
I suggest a synthesis and extension of prior methodologies I term the sensory-
experiential method. This methodology adopts the concept of a naturalized 
phenomenology (Yoshimi 2016: 287). This approach suggests the use of scientific 
methodology to test phenomenological concepts through experimentation. In archaeology 
this can be done through experimental archaeology and reconstruction. Further, ToM can 
be tested scientifically by brain imaging and cognitive studies (Charlton et al. 2009; 
Charman et al. 2000). Archaeological interpretations cannot be fully scientific but this is 
the most effective route for implementing a naturalized phenomenology in archaeology. 
The sensory-experiential method is designed to set phenomenology in 
archaeology on a sounder theoretical basis. The approach is interdisciplinary to combine 
different strands of inference into one narrative of past experience. The goal is to 
reinvigorate phenomenology in archaeology as an opportunity to understand past human 
experience through the material record.  
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